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Abstract
The Ollivier-Poulin-Zurek definition of objectivity provides a philosophical basis
for the environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory and hence for quan-
tum Darwinism. It is shown that no account of the reference of the key terms in this
definition can be given that does not render the definition inapplicable within quan-
tum theory. It is argued that this is not the fault of the language used, but of the
assumption that the laws of physics are independent of Hilbert-space decomposition.
All evidence suggests that this latter assumption is true. If it is, decoherence cannot
explain the emergence of classicality.
Keywords: Decoherence; Quantum Darwinism; Classical information; Environment as
Witness; Decomposition into systems; Semantics
1 Introduction
In papers published in Physical Review Letters and Physical Review in 2004 and 2005
respectively, H. Ollivier, D. Poulin and W. H. Zurek proposed an operational definition of
objectivity for physical systems:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
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1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
Ollivier et al. (2004) p. 1; Ollivier et al. (2005) p. 3
This “OPZ” definition makes explicit the sense of “objectivity” being sought in the attempt
to explain the “emergence of classicality” within decoherence theory. It is stated within a
theoretical context that treats minimal quantum theory - quantum theory with no physical
“collapse” of quantum states into classicality - as an “ultimate theory that needs no mod-
ifications to account for the emergence of the classical” (Zurek (2007), p. 1). By defining
“objectivity” explicitly within minimal quantum theory, it provides a philosophical basis
for the “environment as witness” formulation of decoherence theory (Ollivier et al., 2004,
2005; Zurek, 2007) and the “quantum Darwinist” account of the emergence of classicality
from the quantum world (Zurek, 2003; Blume-Kohout and Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2009).
By treating the environment as an all-pervasive witness that mediates and hence enables
observations, the environment as witness formulation and quantum Darwinism replace the
traditional concept of decoherence as an irreversible loss of quantum information (Zeh,
1970, 1973; Zurek, 1981, 1982; Joos and Zeh, 1985; Zeh, 2006) with a more positive con-
cept of decoherence as an observer-independent generator of classical information. This
positive view of decoherence as both agent and explanation of the emergence of classicality
has been widely adopted: classical information is now routinely defined as quantum infor-
mation that has survived decoherence (e.g. Griffiths (2007)), decoherence-based reasoning
is commonly employed to explain the post-inflation emergence of a classical universe with
determinate particle masses and other properties (e.g. Martineau (2006); Tegmark (2010);
Kiefer et al. (2011); Bousso and Susskind (2011)), and decoherence is taken to differentiate
and hence define both Everett branches (Tegmark, 2010; Wallace, 2010) and consistent
histories (Griffiths, 2002; Hartle, 2008; Griffiths, 2011) in interpretations of quantum mea-
surement (see also Zurek (1998); Schlosshauer (2004); Bacciagaluppi (2007); Landsman
(2007); Schlosshauer (2007); Wallace (2008) for general discussions of the foundational role
of decoherence in the emergence of classicality).
The OPZ definition of objectivity seems straightforward: given a physical system S, the
objective properties of S are the properties that unbiased observers can agree about. The
present paper argues that this seeming straightforwardness is deceptive; in particular, it
argues that no properties that are specified entirely within the quantum formalism satisfy
the OPZ definition of objectivity. The only role of the OPZ definition of objectivity within
decoherence theory appears, indeed, to be that of importing a priori classical assumptions
into the theory, assumptions that observers must share in order to “arrive at a consensus”
about what they are observing and hence that violate the provisions of the OPZ definition
itself that forbid “prior agreement” and “prior knowledge” on the part of the observers.
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To begin the argument, it is necessary to explicitly recognize that if “objectivity” is to be
a theoretical concept defined within minimal quantum theory, which it must be if minimal
quantum theory to is to be an “ultimate theory that needs no modifications - and in
particular, no extra-theoretical conceptual additions - to account for the emergence of
the classical,” then observers cannot assume that either properties or the systems they
characterize are objective a priori. Instead, they must be able to employ the completely
quantum-theoretic OPZ definition to discover what properties of any physical system S
are objective. The definition must, in other words, be operational, and must apply to
each quantum system for which objective properties are discoverable, as a matter of fact,
by observers. What is shown below is that the OPZ definition cannot be operationalized
by observers unless they assume, a priori and from outside of quantum theory, the very
sense of “objectivity” that is purportedly being defined. The paper concludes that the
environment does not serve as a “witness” in any quantum-theoretically meaningful sense,
and that the environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory does not explain
the emergence of classicality. It suggests that classicality and objectivity do not, in fact,
emerge from a quantum-theoretic description of the world, but are rather imposed upon it
by communities of mutually-reporting observers.
It is also necessary to state explicitly an underlying assumption: that minimal quantum the-
ory applies universally. This universality assumption is clearly required if minimal quantum
theory is to be an “ultimate theory that needs no modifications to account for the emergence
of the classical” and is taken to be uncontroversial in the current context. The assumption
that minimal quantum theory applies universally has two immediate consequences. First,
all physical systems are quantum systems, and all physical states are quantum states; there
are no intrinsically classical physical systems, and hence no systems for which classical
objectivity can fairly be assumed a priori. Quantum theoretic specifications of systems
are, therefore, taken to be ontologically definitive; any “emergence” of classically must be
accounted for fully and completely within quantum theory. Observers may treat the en-
vironment, each other, or their items of apparatus as classical systems, as Bohr (1928)
insisted they must, but doing so is either an approximation or simply an error; no clas-
sical specification is ontologically definitive, and describing a system classically does not
make it classical. Second, the quantum-mechanical formalism applies, mutatis mutandis,
to all physical systems. It applies, in particular, to macroscopic laboratory apparatus, to
the general environment, to observers, and as Everett (1957) insisted, to the universe as a
whole.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 What is a “physical system”?
The OPZ definition is straightforwardly about properties of physical systems: it states
the conditions under which such properties may be regarded as “objective.” Hence the
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first question to ask about the OPZ definition is, what is a “physical system”? As the
assumption that minimal quantum theory applies universally requires that any physical
system be a quantum system, one might as well ask, what is a “quantum system”?
There are clearly two kinds of answers to this question that, from a practical point of
view, fall on different sides of the macroscopic - microscopic divide. These two kinds of
answers correspond to two distinct ways of saying what counts as a physical system. One is
demonstrative; as Fuchs puts it, “this and this and this ... every particular that is and every
way of carving up every particular that is” (Fuchs (2010) p. 22). To select a particular
example, the ion-trap apparatus employed by Brune et al. (1996) in their classic study of
the timecourse of decoherence is a physical system; its various parts - its vacuum chamber,
ion source, pumps, magnets, lasers, detectors, read-outs and so forth - are all physical
systems as well. The second kind of answer is theoretical. What counts as a rubidium ion
produced by the ion source in the Brune et al. experiments is defined theoretically, as are the
quantum systems comprising one or more Rb ions in interaction with the electromagnetic
fields inside the ion trap. These theoretically-defined entities are physical systems although
they can only be demonstrated by demonstrating the ion trap itself - or something like it -
and invoking the theory.
The statement of the OPZ definition does not restrict it to one kind of physical system or
the other; hence it is fair to assume that it is intended to apply to both. Let ‘S’ name the
ion trap apparatus of Brune et al.; one can then write an instance of the OPZ definition
that applies to properties of S:
“A property of the physical system S is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about S,
and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
This specific instance of the OPZ definition specifies the conditions under which a property
of the ion trap apparatus of Brune et al. is objective, one of which is that observers “are
able to find out what (the property in question) is without prior knowledge” about the
ion-trap apparatus. One could equally well stipulate that ‘S’ named the quantum system
comprising whatever Rb ions were interacting with the electromagnetic fields inside the ion
trap at some particular observation time t; in this case the OPZ definition would specify
the conditions under which the properties of that system were objective, one of which is
that observers would be “able to find out what (the property in question) is without prior
knowledge” about the Rb ions or their interactions with the electromagnetic fields inside
the ion trap.
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2.2 What is a “property” of a physical system?
The second question to be asked about the OPZ definition is, what is a “property”? What,
in other words, are the candidates for the kind of objectivity that the OPZ definition defines?
What, moreover, does it mean for a property to be a property of a physical system? What
does it mean for a property to be a property of the ion trap apparatus of Brune et al., or
a property of an Rb ion in interaction with an electromagnetic field?
Here again, there appear to be both demonstrative and theoretical answers. The apparatus
of Brune et al. is (or at least was) located in Paris; “located in Paris” is thus a property of S
if ‘S’ names the apparatus of Brune et al. This property is macroscopic, and it characterizes
the apparatus as a bulk material object. It is also in an important sense obvious ; it would be
clear to any reasonably-aware observer, on actually encountering the apparatus, that it was
located in Paris. The principal result reported by Brune et al. (1996), on the other hand, is
that controlling the interactions of the Rb ions with the electromagnetic fields inside the ion
trap controls the decoherence time of the ionization state of the ions. “Has an ionization-
state decoherence time of 38 µs” is, therefore, a property of some Rb ions (Brune et al.
(1996) p. 4890). This property is microscopic, and it characterizes a microscopic object
that is only observable for a brief period of time. It is, moreover, not obvious; knowing
what either an ionization state or a decoherence time are requires knowing at least some
quantum theory.
2.3 Properties, degrees of freedom, and Hilbert spaces
Quantum theory characterizes physical systems in terms of physical degrees of freedom. If
S is a physical system, the allowed values of the degrees of freedom of S correspond to basis
vectors of the Hilbert space describing S. One can, therefore, ask how the properties of a
physical system that are characterized by the OPZ definition of objectivity relate to the
degrees of freedom of the system, their allowed values, or the Hilbert-space representation
of these allowed values.
If quantum theory applies universally to all physical systems, then it applies to the universe
U as a whole. One can, therefore, talk about the degrees of freedom ofU, the allowed values
of these degrees of freedom, and the Hilbert space HU spanned by these allowed values.
The universal state |U〉 is a vector in HU; as U is by definition isolated, |U〉 is a pure state
and satisfies a Schro¨dinger equation (∂/∂t)|U〉 = −(ı/~)HU|U〉, where HU is the universal
Hamiltonian. The question of the emergence of classicality is, at bottom, a question about
HU. Zurek, for example, opens his classic 1998 “rough guide” to decoherence (Zurek, 1998)
by remarking that “it is far from clear how one can define systems given an overall Hilbert
space ‘of everything’ and the total Hamiltonian” (p. 1794) and closes it with “a compelling
explanation of what the systems are - how to define them given, say, the overall Hamiltonian
in some suitably large Hilbert space - would undoubtedly be most useful” (p. 1818).
Any system S must be part of U; hence its degrees of freedom must be among the degrees
of freedom of U. The Hilbert space HS of any system can, therefore, be regarded as
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a component of a tensor-product decomposition HS ⊗ HE = HU of HU, where HE is
the Hilbert space of a second system E conventionally called the “environment” of S.
As U is unique, any given system S has a unique environment E; the tensor-product
decomposition HS⊗HE = HU can thus be taken to define S in terms of E and vice-versa.
Conversely, if no E exists such that HS ⊗HE = HU, S cannot be a physical system. This
conception of physical systems as defined by Hilbert-space decompositions ofU is central to
decoherence theory and to the project of explaining the emergence of classicality. Indeed,
Zurek introduces as “axiom(o)” of quantum theory that “the Universe consists of systems”
and “a composite system can be described by a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the
constituent systems” (Zurek (2003) p. 746; see also Zurek (2007), p. 3; Zurek (2005), p.
2).
With this Hilbert-space understanding of systems, it is clear that the properties referred
to in the OPZ definition of objectivity can only be observable and hence allowed values
of degrees of freedom. It is, moreover, clear that the properties referred to in the OPZ
definition of objectivity must be observable and hence allowed values of degrees of freedom
of particular systems. The allowed values of position represented by basis vectors of HS,
for example, are allowed values of the position of S, or of the positions of components of S.
Alternatively, they are allowed values of the positions of components of U that happen to
be included within the (Hilbert-space) boundary of S. They are, specifically, not allowed
values of the position of E, or of anything contained within E, although the position of
E may have allowed values that are numerically equal to those of S. It is this division
of the degrees of freedom of U, i.e. of all degrees of freedom, into degrees of freedom of
S and degrees of freedom of E that is indicated by HS ⊗ HE = HU. Properties of S
and properties of E are similarly divided, even though as measured values they may be
numerically identical.
Two opposing points of view can be taken about the degrees of freedom that characterize
physical systems and the properties that correspond to their allowed values. One point
of view, exemplified by the radical anti-reductionism of Fuchs (2010), treats all possible
degrees of freedom on an absolutely equal basis; the objective division of the “real world”
into systems of fixed and finite Hilbert-space dimension is taken for granted and no attempt
is made to decompose any system into smaller “building blocks” or to reconstruct any
degree of freedom from a combination of more “fundamental” degrees of freedom. As
Fuchs points out, the question of the emergence of classicality does not arise from this
point of view; classical objectivity is simply assumed a priori. Indeed Fuchs “declares
the quantum-to-classical research program unnecessary (and actually obstructive)” and
insists that “the thing that needs insight is not the quantum-to-classical transition, but the
classical-to-quantum” (Fuchs (2010) p. 24, main text and fn. 46). The alternative point
of view is that embraced by the majority of working physicists. Macroscopic systems are
viewed as composites of microscopic systems from the molecular scale down to the scale of
Standard Model particles, and macroscopic degrees of freedom are viewed as “bulk” degrees
of freedom - such as total mass or center-of-mass position - that are exact mathematical
consequences of the more fundamental degrees of freedom of the constituents, again down
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to the scale of Standard Model degrees of freedom. From this perspective, only the most
fundamental degrees of freedom need be considered when specifying the “real” Hilbert-space
representation of any system; all other degrees of freedom “emerge” as physical consequences
of the action of HU. Indeed from this perspective, the goal of science is to explain precisely
how all non-fundamental degrees of freedom emerge as consequences of the action of HU.
Standard Big-Bang cosmology, with its implied hierarchy of “special sciences” to deal with
such emergent properties as life and cognition, clearly reflects this latter perspective.
2.4 Observers
The final question that must be asked about the OPZ definition of objectively is, what is
an “observer”? As is traditional in physics, Zurek says very little about observers: “deco-
herence treats observer as any other macroscopic system. There is, however, one feature
distinguishing observers from the rest of the Universe ... (they) can readily consult the
content of their memory” (Zurek (2003) p. 759), and later “the observer’s mind (that
verifies, finds out, etc.) constitutes a primitive notion which is prior to that of scientific
reality” (p. 763-764). Zurek does not elaborate on this characterization of observers, and
does not explicitly consider whether these assumptions about observers impact the status
of quantum theory as an “ultimate theory” or the project of explaining the emergence of
classicality quantum-theoretically. Zurek does, however, explicitly characterize the typical
position of an observer with respect to an observed system. Even when observing a macro-
scopic system, Zurek points out, an observer is typically interacting with the environment
of the system - the surrounding ambient photon field, for example. It is, indeed, this dis-
tance between the observer and the observed system that allows the environment to act as
a witness, and that enables the redundant environmental encoding of information about
the system that many observers can separately access (Ollivier et al., 2004, 2005; Zurek,
2007; Blume-Kohout and Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2009).
This notion of a distant observer can be made precise as follows (Blume-Kohout and Zurek,
2006; Zurek, 2009). Let S be a system and E be its environment, i.e. let HS ⊗HE = HU.
Let {Fk} be a finite set of disjoint “fragments” of E, all of which are sufficiently distant
from S and from each other to be regarded as separable from S and from each other for
all practical purposes (FAPP). In practice, the fragments Fk are assumed to be small with
respect to U; this assumption assures that U has sufficient degrees of freedom to fully
decohere any embedded system S while preserving the FAPP separability of S from the Fk .
Let {Ok} be a set of observers, Fk be the fragment occupied by Ok when Ok is distant
from S, and Ek be the environment “shared” by S and Ok , i.e. HS ⊗HEk ⊗HOk = HU.
The fragments Fj occupied by all observers, and indeed all observers Oj with j 6= k, are
clearly contained within the shared environment Ek of the k
th observer, for all k.
This characterization of the positions of observers introduces a subtle but important as-
sumption. Consider any two observers Oj and Ok , who are embedded in their respective
fragments Fj and Fk . If this situation is to be well-defined, the Hilbert-space decomposi-
tions HS ⊗HEj ⊗HOj = HS ⊗HEk ⊗HOk = HU. In this case, however, the physics being
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well defined - and in particular, the Hamiltonian HU being well-defined - requires that
HU be independent of Hilbert-space decomposition. This independence, called “decompo-
sitional equivalence” in Fields (2012a,b,c), is assured by the linearity of the Hamiltonian,
i.e. by HU =
∑
ij Hij where the indices i and j range over the degrees of freedom of U,
provided that only fundamental degrees of freedom of U are considered, or alternatively,
provided that all possible composite degrees of freedom of U are considered in addition to
the fundamental degrees of freedom. What decompositional equivalence specifically disal-
lows is that interactions between composite degrees of freedom defined with respect to some
particular tensor-product decompositions of HU are included in HU while others are not.
Were this to be the case, the physics of U as a whole would depend on its tensor-product
decomposition, i.e. it would not be well-defined. In particular, any alteration of the Fk or
the Ek could, in principle, change the global physics of U. While it is, of course, possible
that the physics of U as a whole is not well-defined, this possibility is inconsistent with the
assumption that minimal quantum theory applies universally.
The characterization of observers as confined to distinct, separable environmental fragments
also raises a question about the meaning of “consensus” in the OPZ definition. The most
natural interpretation of this term, in context, is the idea that the various observers make
their observations, and then discuss the results to determine whether they have observed
the same property P of the quantum system S. It may be objected, however, that this is
too “human” an interpretation, that perhaps the observers are just computers that record
outcomes, as if often the case in practice. What does “consensus” mean then? If the
observers employ comparable data structures and are connected by a network that supports
the exchange of outcome records, “consensus” can clearly be achieved algorithmically. It
may, however, be the case that the observers are not so connected, and that their outcome
records are collected and examined by some third party. In this case, clearly, the relevant
third party must determine whether each observer detected P as a property of S. This
is exactly the problem faced by the observers themselves in either of the previous two
scenarios; hence the “human” interpretation can be assumed, without loss of generality, in
assessing the informational requirements of achieving the required consensus.
2.5 Einselection and the environment as witness
Suppose S and E interact via a Hamiltonian HS−E. The environment as witness formu-
lation is based on two observations. First, provided the interaction HS−E is sufficiently
larger FAPP than the self-interactions of either S or E, it forces both S and E into (at least
approximate) eigenstates of HS−E. Zurek (1981, 1982, 1998) termed this forcing of interact-
ing systems into eigenstates of their interaction “environmentally-induced superselection”
or einselection; Landsman has called einselection “the most important and powerful idea
in quantum theory since entanglement” (Landsman (2007) p. 511). Second, observers typi-
cally interact with quantum systems indirectly, by interacting with their local environments
as discussed above. An observer interacting with a local (to the observer) fragment of the
environment extracts information not from the system being observed, but from an encod-
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ing of the state of that system present in the observer’s local environmental fragment. This
local fragment serves as a “witness” to the S−E interaction and hence to the state |S〉
because its state |Fk〉 is einselected by HS−E Ollivier et al. (2004, 2005); observers obtain
information by querying such witnesses. Quantum Darwinism adds to the environment as
witness formulation the observation that if the fragments Fk are FAPP separable both from
S and each other, multiple observers Ok can obtain information from their local encodings
without interfering either with each other or with S. If this is the case, agreement among
observers is possible and both S and its observed properties can be regarded as “objective”
under the OPZ definition (Blume-Kohout and Zurek, 2006; Zurek, 2007, 2009).
Applications of the OPZ definition to practical measurement situations clearly require cer-
tain additional assumptions. First, the multiple observers involved must each recognize
the others as observers; otherwise the requirement for “consensus” cannot be fulfilled. As
discussed above, this “recognition” can be implemented algorithmically; it merely requires
interpretability of data structures across observers, or between all the observers and some
third party. Such interpretability requires, however, that the objectivity of some systems -
the observers themselves - be assumed a priori. Second, the observers must agree to interact
with their local fragments of the environment in comparable bases; all must, for example,
agree to probe ambient visual-spectrum photons when making their observations. This is a
“prior agreement” among the observers, one that concerns their interactions with E, not S.
It introduces, however, a second objectivity assumption: the observers must jointly assume
the objectivity of the physical medium - the ambient photon field, for example - that their
observations probe. Finally, the observers must share a means of communication, and this
means of communication must include some symbol that is jointly agreed, or which some
third party interprets, to refer to the system about which the observational consensus is to
be reached. Call this symbol ‘S’. This is also a “prior agreement” among the observers, or
between the observers and the third party, one that concerns neither E nor S but rather
the observers themselves. As will be shown, it is the need for this final, semantic prior
agreement that renders the OPZ definition inapplicable within quantum theory alone.
3 The semantics of ‘S’
Suppose that observers O1 and O2 make observations while within their respective en-
vironmental fragments F1 and F2, after which they confer to compare results. Suppose
further that both observers employ the name ‘S’ when referring to the system that they
have observed, i.e. the system whose states are encoded by the states |F1〉 and |F2〉 with
which they have respectively interacted. One can ask how the name ‘S’ is being taken to
refer, and whether O1 and O2 can provide evidence that their uses of ‘S’ in fact refer to the
same thing. These are not merely metaphysical questions: they are often asked seriously
in practice, for example when interviewing witnesses to crimes or determining whether two
graduate students are reporting observations of the same item of apparatus. Such questions
also arise in a considerably more subtle form when it becomes necessary to confirm that
the degrees of freedom of an experimental apparatus have not changed - that is, when it
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becomes necessary to confirm that one “system” has not unexpectedly been replaced by
a different “system” that may exhibit different behavior - from one replicating run of an
experiment to the next. This kind of question is regularly gotten wrong in the course of
experimental research, sometimes with significant practical consequences.
3.1 Option 1: ‘S’ is a rigid designator
Suppose that two observers O1 and O2 are observing a macroscopic system S that has
been “given” demonstratively, such as the ion trap apparatus of Brune et al. In this case,
the observers are able to directly perceive local environmental encodings of the state of S,
e.g. by interacting with the ambient photon field. Suppose O1 and O2 employ the name
‘S’ to refer to S, and suppose further that ‘S’ is a rigid designator, that is, that the name
‘S’ refers to S independently of any beliefs that employers of ‘S’ may have about S, and
that in fact all beliefs that some employers of ‘S’ have about S may be wrong without this
affecting their reference to S by the use of ‘S’.
Suppose now that O1 and O2 have positioned themselves within disjoint, effectively sep-
arable environmental fragments F1 and F2, have agreed to interact with their respective
fragments in comparable bases - e.g. to make observations visually - and wish to employ the
OPZ definition operationally to determine whether S, that is, the system that they rigidly
designate with the name ‘S’, has objective properties. The OPZ definition tells them that
a property P of S is objective if it is simultaneously accessible to O1 and O2, if they can
characterize it without knowing anything about S, and if they can reach a consensus that
each other’s characterizations are correct without prior agreements about S. As a specific
case, suppose that O1 and O2 both report the property P as “indicates the pointer value
5” after interacting with F1 and F2 respectively. Are they then justified, via the OPZ
definition, in concluding that P is an objective property of S?
To answer this question, it is essential to distinguish two prima facie possibilities that
the wording of the third clause, “who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior
agreement” of the OPZ definition potentially conflates. The most straightforward is that
the “consensus” to be reached is that the observed property P is a property of S, the
physical system rigidly designated by ‘S’. The second, less straightforward possibility is
that the consensus to be reached merely concerns P , irrespective of the system or systems
of which P is a property. The potential conflation of these two possibilities raises a question
about the OPZ definition itself: does it require that the observers also reach an evidence-
based consensus - or alternatively assume a priori - that the properties that they report
are properties of a single particular system S? In the particular case being considered
here, does the OPZ definition require that if the chosen name ‘S’ is a rigid designator, that
the observers agree that it is a rigid designator, and agree that their observations concern
whatever ‘S’ designates?
This question of potential conflation is, fortunately, resolved by the formalism itself. The
environment as witness framework collapses unless the state |S〉 of S is encoded redundantly
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in multiple environmental fragments Fk , and much recent work on quantum Darwinism
has been devoted to demonstrating that redundant encoding in fact occurs (Zwolak et al.,
2009; Riedel and Zurek, 2010; Zwolak et al., 2010). The reason for this is obvious: two
observational reports of pointer values of 5, for example, convey no information of practical
use unless they also specify which pointer was observed. Imagine two graduate students
reporting values of 5, for example, without being able to say what gauge they were reading or
even whether they were reading the same one! Without actual, in-fact encoding redundancy
and hence the ability to attribute observed properties to specific systems, whether observers
agree about observed properties becomes irrelevant and the notion of “objectivity” loses
all meaning. Redundant encoding is, however, necessary but not sufficient for objectivity
under the OPZ definition: the observers must also reach a consensus that they have each,
in fact, interacted with such a redundant encoding. Thus in the above scenario, O1 and O2
still must establish, to each other’s satisfaction, that their reports of a pointer value of 5
are due to interactions with redundant encodings of the state of S, not to interactions with
encodings of the states of systems other than S, if they are to apply the OPZ definition. It is
worth noting that any third party receiving outcome reports fromO1 andO2 must similarly
establish the physical provenance of these reports in order to meaningfully compare them.
It is at this point that the semantics of ‘S’ become important. If ‘S’ is a rigid designator,
the reference relation between ‘S’ and S cannot depend on the beliefs of O1 and O2, and in
particular cannot depend on their joint belief that they have observed P . Hence ‘the thing
that has P ’ - which is clearly a definite description - cannot be employed as a synonym for
‘S’. Instead, O1 and O2 must be able to demonstrate to each other that their observations
of P are due to interactions with redundant encodings of the state of S, whatever S is.
That is, O1 and O2 must each be able to demonstrate an encoding |Fk〉 in their own Fk
with which they have interacted, and demonstrate that this |Fk〉 is in fact a redundant
encoding of the state of S, whatever S is.
It is clear, however, that O1 and O2 can make neither of these required demonstrations
within the restrictions imposed by the environment as witness framework. The environ-
mental fragments F1 and F2 to which O1 and O2 are confined are not only disjoint but are
by assumption causally decoupled FAPP; hence O1 has no observational access to events
occurring within F2 and vice-versa. The encodings with which O1 and O2 interact do not,
therefore, meet the requirement of simultaneous accessibility imposed by the OPZ defini-
tion and hence cannot be regarded as objective on its criteria. Moreover, as shown in more
detail previously (Fields, 2010, 2011), neither O1 nor O2 can step out of their respective
fragments and manipulate S directly without destroying the very encodings that they are
attempting to relate to S. Without an ability to demonstrate that they are interacting with
redundant encodings of the state of S, however, O1 and O2 can employ the OPZ definition
of objectivity only if they assume that they are interacting with redundant encodings, and
hence assume that their reports of P refer to properties of one particular system S. This is
a physical assumption about the interactions between S, E and the various Ok that is ruled
out on any reasonable reading of the OPZ definition’s restrictions on “prior knowledge”
and “prior agreement” among observers. In particular, it is an assumption that is justified
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only if the observed property P is assumed to be objective in the classical sense that the
OPZ definition is attempting to define. Hence if ‘S’ is regarded as a rigid designator, the
OPZ definition of objectivity is impossible to apply operationally without assuming what
it is attempting to define - classical objectivity - from outside of quantum theory.
3.2 Interlude: Wigner’s friend
The classic paradox of Wigner’s friend illustrates the situation faced by multiple observers
of a quantum system. In the scenario, Wigner and his friend jointly prepare a macroscopic
quantum system in some state |S(t0 )〉, and agree that the friend will perform some particular
measurement on the time evolved state |S(t1 )〉 at some specifed t1 > t0. Wigner then leaves
the room, and returns at t2 > t1 after his friend has conducted the measurement. The
paradox arises when we compare the beliefs of Wigner and his friend concerning |S(t1 )〉.
Having made the measurement, the friend believes that |S(t1 )〉 is an eigenstate of the
measurement interaction. Not having made the measurement, Wigner can only represent
an entangled state |(S⊗ friend)(t1 )〉, a state that “collapses” only when he asks his friend
about the result.
Wigner’s friend is traditionally presented as an illustration of the mystery of wave-function
collapse; indeed Wigner himself inferred from it that a “being with consciousness must
have a different role in quantum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device” (Wigner
(1962), p. 294). This “mystery” is nicely dispatched by decoherence considerations. If one
considers the environment to have witnessed and encoded every step in the scenario, Wigner
can infer before re-entering the room that any S⊗friend entanglement was very short-lived,
and that while he is ignorant of the result, his friend is not. This straightforward and natural
solution to the puzzle, however, glosses over the second deep issue raised by Wigner’s friend.
By explicitly separating the joint preparation of the system from the friend’s measurement,
and the friend’s measurement from Wigner’s later query, the Wigner’s friend scenario raises
the question of how both Wigner and his friend re-identify the system after preparing it.
How do they know what ‘S’ refers to from time to time, and how do they know that their
uses of ‘S’ refer to the same thing? More prosaically, how does the friend know that she
has interacted at t1 with the same system that she and Wigner jointly prepared at t0? If
“systems” are collections of physical degrees of freedom, how does the friend know that
she is interacting with the same collection of physical degrees of freedom at t1 as at t0,
as opposed to interacting with more, less, or just different degrees of freedom? These are
precisely the questions of system identification and term reference with which the present
paper is concerned.
As shown above, if ‘S’ is regarded as a rigid designator, Wigner and his friend have no way
of demonstrating that the environmental encodings with which they interact are environ-
mental encodings of |S〉; even to prepare S, they have to assume that they are seeing and
manipulating the same system. The strength of this assumption, moreover, increases with
time: when Wigner returns to the laboratory at t2, he has to assume not only that ‘S’ still
refers to something in the vicinity, but also that he can correctly re-identify his friend, the
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physical system to whom he must address his question about the results of the measurement
carried out at t1. Note that Wigner must assume that he can correctly identify his friend
even if his “friend” is a computer that records the results of the measurement performed at
t1, and must assume that he can correctly identify his friend even if his “friend” is his own
memory of himself performing the measurement at t1. However we are to understand these
assumptions, it is clear that they are outside of quantum theory: if ‘S’ and other names of
physical systems are regarded as rigid designators, Zurek’s dream of quantum theory as an
“ultimate theory that needs no modifications to account for the emergence of the classical”
is unrealizable.
There is, however, no compelling argument that names of physical systems, at least as they
are employed in the quantum-mechanical formalism, refer as rigid designators. As noted
earlier, physical systems can also be specified theoretically. Theoretical specifications of
systems are descriptive specifications, so system names based on theoretical specifications
are not rigid designators but rather definite descriptions. Given the ubiquity of theoretical
specifications such as “let |S〉 =
∑
k λk |sk〉” that appear to define systems in terms of
collections of allowed values of degrees of freedom that are characterized by sets of Hilbert-
space basis vectors, the claim that names such as ‘S’ typically refer as definite descriptions
has at least prima facie plausibility. If we imagine that Wigner is using ‘S’ and “my
friend” as definite descriptions, then when he returns to the laboratory he can use these
terms to refer to whatever satisfies the descriptive criteria he has in mind. In the language
of decoherence, if the environmental encoding with which he is interacting appears by his
chosen criteria to be an environmental encoding of his friend, that is good enough.
The use of descriptive information to identify physical systems is not only consonant with
intuition and notational practice, it is a practical requirement of classical automata theory.
All systems continuously broadcast information into the environment. An agent receiving
this information is faced, first and foremost, with the source identification problem: the task
of sorting out which signals are from which systems. Suppose all the systems are finite-state
machines; the source identification problem is then equivalent to the problem of assigning
the most recently-received signal to a particular finite-state machine as its source. That
such an assignment cannot be made uniquely using signal data alone was proven by Moore
(1956): signals can only be assigned uniquely to sources if a priori assumptions about
source-signal relationships are brought to bear. The requirement for a priori assumptions
to justify the assignment of signals to unique sources was used by Chomsky (1965) to
demolish the then-dominate stimulus-response theory of language learning, and has formed
the basis for computational analyses of perception at least since the work of Marr (1982)
on computational models of early vision. In the present context, the critical question
is whether the a priori assumptions required to identify physical systems as sources of
observed signals can be framed and answered within quantum theory, and whether the
OPZ definition usefully captures both their framing and their answers.
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3.3 Option 2: ‘S’ is a definite description
Suppose that ‘S’ is a definite description, that is, that the name ‘S’ refers to some physical
system S in virtue of S instantiating some set {Qi} of properties taken to be criterial.
Suppose as above that two observers O1 and O2 have positioned themselves within disjoint,
effectively separable environmental fragments F1 and F2, have agreed to interact with
their respective fragments in a particular basis, and wish to employ the OPZ definition
operationally to determine whether S has objective properties. Clearly O1 and O2 cannot
employ the OPZ definition to determine whether the properties Qi are objective; this would
be blatantly circular. Instead O1 and O2 must be imagined to be employing the OPZ
definition to determine whether some property P /∈ {Qi} is objective. Such a situation
is commonplace: O1 and O2 specify some system S in terms of a specified set of Hilbert-
space basis vectors by saying, “let |S〉 =
∑
k λk |sk〉” and proceed to interact with S using
operators such as xˆ, pˆ and sˆz to detect and characterize properties other than “is specified
by the Hilbert-space decomposition HS ⊗HE = HU.”
As might be expected, the difficulty with this commonplace scenario is that what must be
established is that the eigenvalues of xˆ acting on the system of interest S are objective. It is
the eigenvalues of, e.g. xˆ|S〉 that O1 and O2 must “arrive at a consensus about ... without
prior agreement.” To reach such a consensus, O1 and O2 must be able to establish to each
other’s satisfaction that the eigenvalues that they report are eigenvalues of S. Hence they
must be able to show that the eigenvalues that they have measured are indeed eigenvalues
of the system that they have mutually defined in terms of the particular basis vectors {|sk〉}
that represent the allowed values of the specified degrees of freedom of S, not eigenvalues
of something else.
It has been shown, however, that this cannot be done within the confines of quantum theory
(Fields, 2011). If O1 and O2 are confined to F1 and F2, this is clear: nothing they can do
from a distance can establish that the system they are interacting with is spanned exactly
by a given microscopic basis {|sk〉}, i.e. that what they are interacting with has the degrees
of freedom for which the stipulated |sk〉 represent the allowed values and no other degrees
of freedom, and hence the Hilbert space HS and not some other Hilbert space. Were O1,
for example, to step outside of F1, reach into HS and manipulate the amplitudes of the
|sk〉 directly in order to determine whether the degrees of freedom within S and only these
degrees of freedom were responsible for the observed eigenvalues, O2’s observations would
be disrupted by the manipulations, and the effects of the manipulations on the encoding
of |S〉 within F1 would go unrecorded. As in the case considered above, therefore, direct
manipulations of the presumed system of interest cannot resolve the question of whether
the observers are looking at the same thing. Multiple observers can assume that their
measurements are being conducted on the same system, and hence assume that their shared
name ‘S’ is a definite description in the strict sense of picking out a unique referent, but they
cannot demonstrate it empirically. These assumptions are, moreover, physical assumptions,
assumptions about how the particular degrees of freedom that have been stipulated as being
the degrees of freedom of S, those explicitly carved out by the Hilbert-space decomposition
HS⊗HE = HU, interact with the rest of the world. Hence they cannot be countenanced by
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the OPZ definition. As in the case of a semantics based on rigid designators, a semantics
based on definite descriptions renders the OPZ definition either inapplicable or pointless.
3.4 Coda: Formal versus informal language
It is widely assumed that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics provides not
only a means of calculating testable numerical predictions, but also a language for describing
reality that is intrinsically more precise and conceptually less problematic than ordinary
natural languages. With this assumption comes the methodological notion that the sooner
one can abandon discursive prose and start proving theorems, the better. “Shut up and
calculate” is the natural limiting case of this methodological notion.
As emphasized repeatedly by Bohr, however, experimentalists still speak with each other
about macroscopic apparatus using ordinary language, supplemented by pointing or other
indicative gestures when necessary. In doing so, they assume the classical objectivity of the
referents of their words and gestures, if not in any deep metaphysical sense, at least in the
practical sense of assuming that they can know what each other are talking about. The point
of the above discussion is that theorists are no better off; they must assume that symbols like
‘S’ refer in the same way that experimentalists must assume that phrases like “the ATLAS
detector” refer. From the perspective of reference, the quantum mechanical formalism
provides no help at all; questions about the reference of terms in the formalism are every
bit as problematic as they are for corresponding terms in the natural languages that the
formalism supplants. It is, therefore, futile to turn to the formalism for an “explanation”
of the appearance or “emergence” of objectivity that is not forthcoming using natural
language terms like “that system over there” or “the ATLAS detector.” The next section
examines why this is the case, by exploring in greater detail the assumptions being made
when specifying that something is a “physical system.”
4 The underlying issue: Decompositional equivalence
The treatment of macroscopic objects in classical physics involves a seldom-stated antinomy.
One the one hand, the macroscopic objects of ordinary experience are regarded as having
boundaries that the laws of physics respect. A cannonball, for example, is acted upon by
the laws of classical dynamics as a single cohesive object; it is transported from place to
place by mechanical forces without violations of the boundary between it and the rest of the
universe. On the other hand, such entities can be conceptually broken apart or combined
together into smaller or larger systems, and the laws of physics equally applied to these. The
Earth can be considered as a system, for example, without worrying about the boundaries
of the cannonballs that rest or move about on or above its surface. Hence the laws of physics
also appear not to respect boundaries, but to allow them to be reconfigured at whim. The
first of these attitudes or assumptions is a form of commonsense realism about objects: the
Moon is there, for example, as a bounded object even when no-one looks. The second is
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an implicit statement of a symmetry: the laws of physics are assumed to be invariant with
respect to the choice of decomposition into “the system of interest” and “everything else.”
This is the symmetry of decompositional equivalence briefly introduced in §2.4 above.
Decompositional equivalence is a symmetry of fundamental dynamics: it is the claim that
writing the Hilbert spaceHU of the universe asHU = HS⊗HE for some particular system S
and its environment E has no impact on the Hamiltonian HU, i.e. that HU =
∑
ij Hij where
i and j range without restriction over fundamental degrees of freedom of U, or equivalently
that HU = HS +HE +HS−E for any choice of S and E for which HU = HS⊗HE. Decom-
positional equivalence is what allows a distinction to be drawn between the fundamental
dymanics HU and the “emergent” dynamics HS, HE and especially HS−E, i.e. the dynam-
ics that only “appear” when an S− E boundary and hence a Hilbert-space decomposition
of HU is specified. Without decompositional equivalence, the interaction dynamics HS−E
would be not just different, but fundamental for every choice of S and E: different choices of
system boundaries would yield different “universes” with different, decomposition-specific
fundamental physical laws. As pointed out in §2.4, without decompositional equivalence,
the very idea of a “universal dynamics” HU is ill-defined, and the assumption that quantum
theory applies universally must be abandoned.
Decompositional equivalence is clearly a necessary condition for doing science as we know
it: physics in particular would be impossible if shifting system boundaries even potentially
altered fundamental dynamical laws. Without an operating assumption that the laws of
physics do not change when the boundary of the system of interest is shifted, particular
collections of degrees of freedom cannot be selected as the focus of an experiment, and
reliable experimental apparatus cannot be designed or constructed to target such selected
degrees of freedom. Following volumes in phase space, for example, achieves nothing with-
out decompositional equivalence, for selecting a volume to follow could unpredictably alter
the laws governing the physics of the flow. The assumptions of isotropy and homogeneity
that enable a scientific cosmology cannot be made if the choice of “system” affects how
things work. Without decompositional equivalence, any specified boundary encloses a “vi-
tal essense” that exerts an unpredictable influence on everything else. Of recent theorists
of quantum mechanics, Fuchs comes closest to denying decompositional equivalence; he ex-
plicitly rejects the reductionist idea of discovering the “bricks with which nature is made”
(Fuchs (2010) p. 22), and insists that quantum systems are “autonomous entities” whose
actions are “moments of creation” (p. 14). Fuchs does not, however, take the final step
of insisting that how the world is described affects its underlying laws; he takes locality of
causation and separability of distant systems for granted, and offers quantum theory as a
“user’s manual” providing universal rules for rational decision making (p. 8). This step
back from the brink is understandable: decompositional equivalence is a requirement for the
sense of objectivity on which commonsense realism about objects rests, and as mentioned
earlier, commonsense realism about objects is something that Fuchs explicitly adopts.
Let us re-examine the notions of einselection and encoding on which the environment as
witness formulation rests from the perspective of an explicit assumption of decompositional
equivalence. As before, let S be a system, E be its environment, and Fk ⊂ E be a distant
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(from S) fragment of E from within which an observer Ok makes observations. The en-
vironment as witness framework is based on the idea that the interaction HS−E correlates
the state |Fk(t)〉 of the environmental fragment Fk accessed by Ok at time t with the state
|S(t)〉 of S, and that this correlation can be considered an encoding of |S(t)〉 by |Fk(t)〉
from the point of view of Ok , or of a theorist describing the situation. Decompositional
equivalence requires the laws of physics to be independent of the S− E decomposition, and
in particular requires that HS +HE +HS−E = HU for any S and E; hence it requires that
any encoding generated by HS−E be equally viewable as an encoding generated purely by
HU. The universal interaction HU, however, also correlates |Fk(t)〉 with the state |S
′(t)〉
of every alternative system S′ that is sufficiently distant from Fk for FAPP separability
(Fields, 2012b). Hence all possible systems, including all possible systems containing, con-
tained in, or overlapping with S, must simultaneously generate encodings in every distant
environmental fragment, including in particular Fk . Nothing, moreover, requires the spatial
boundaries of physical systems to be simply connected; physicists study many systems -
most notoriously, spatially-separated pairs of particles in asymmetric Bell states - that do
not have simply connected spatial boundaries. The requirement that a fixed set of physical
laws - and hence a fixed dynamics HU - generates encodings of all possible physical systems
therefore also applies to systems comprising degrees of freedom that are not contiguous in
either position or momentum space.
Decompositional equivalence thus requires the state |S′(t)〉 of any possible physical sys-
tem S′ to be einselected, at every instant t, by its interaction with its environment E′, an
environment that by assumption contains Fk as a distant and FAPP separable fragment.
One can now ask, what do the encodings in Fk of these einselected states |S
′(t)〉 look like?
The number of possible systems S′ increases combinatorially with the number of degrees
of freedom of U; for any physically-reasonable Fk , the number of possible S
′ will be far
larger than the number of degrees of freedom of Fk , and can be regarded as arbitrarily large
FAPP. Any particular encoding |Fk(t)〉 will, therefore, be ambiguous between an arbitrar-
ily large number of einselected states |S′(t)〉, and hence ambiguous between an arbitrarily
large number of encoded systems S′ (Fields, 2013). Call the set of einselected states |S′(t)〉
that are encoded by |Fk(t)〉 “Im
−1(|Fk (t)〉),” the inverse image in U of the einselection-
driven encoding |Fk(t)〉. To an observer Ok restricted to Fk , the states in Im
−1(|Fk(t)〉)
and hence the alternative system - environment decompositions that they characterize are
indistinguishable by any physical means. Hence a property P being detectable by measure-
ment within Fk conveys to an observer within Fk only information about |Fk〉; it conveys
no more information about the world outside of Fk than that its state is consistent with
measurements of |Fk〉 revealing P . In particular, it conveys no other classical information
about the world outside of Fk , despite the ubiquitous action of decoherence and einselection.
The inability of Ok to determine the referent of a formal symbol such as ‘S’ from within
Fk is, therefore, due not to any failure of language, but to decompositional equivalence;
‘S’ is ambiguous as a matter of physics between the arbitrarily-large number of alternative
systems for which states are physically encoded in Fk by decoherence and einselection.
The assumption of decompositional equivalence, therefore, undoes the very work of classi-
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cal information creation that decoherence and einselection were designed to do. Without
a specific and restricted set of decompositional boundaries at which to act, decoherence
acts everywhere, creating information about all possible things and hence about noth-
ing. By witnessing everything all the time, the environmental fragment Fk encodes not
easily-extracted classical information about particular systems but rather decomposition-
independent quantum information about the entire rest of the universe. Such witnesses are
of no help to observers; instead of too little, they know far too much.
This understanding of decompositional equivalence allows us, finally, to confront the com-
mon notion that “high-level” properties ofHU somehow result in certain system-environment
boundaries being “preferred” in some objective sense. We can now ask: preferred by what?
The environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory is based on the idea that
the environment prefers some systems over others, but we have seen that this cannot be
the case: HU forces any environmental fragment Fk to encode einselected states of huge
numbers of alternative systems promiscuously, and from the perspective of any observer
confined to that fragment, ambiguously. If preferences on the part of the environment are
rejected, however, the only remaining answer is preferred by us. It is perfectly obvious why
we might prefer some system-environment boundaries over others; as living organisms we
care about what is happening at some system-environment boundaries - our own skins, for
example - and not others. That our preferences not matter is, however, a requirement of
“objectivity” if anything is. We assume decompositional equivalence as a basis for doing
science in order to assure that it has some possibility of being objective. We cannot both
do this, and assume that the boundaries we prefer have any impact on the action of HU.
5 Conclusion
The OPZ definition of objectivity is an attempt to characterize, in operational terms, how
observers can discover a classically objective world. It assumes that classical objectivity
has a physical explanation, and hence motivates the formal construction of such an expla-
nation, quantum Darwinism, through the use of the environment as witness formulation of
decoherence theory. The OPZ definition requires that observers have “no prior knowledge”
of the systems that they observe, and make “no prior agreements” about their properties;
however, it implicitly assumes that the Hilbert-space boundaries of systems of interest to
observers have been specified. It is shown here that any such specification can only come
from the observers themselves; hence if the OPZ definition is not empty, it is circular. It
cannot, therefore, informatively characterize how observers behave, and it cannot effectively
motivate the construction of a physical theory.
The problem with the OPZ definition is, however, not merely that it is inapplicable: it is
the underlying assumption that classical objectivity emerges via an observer-independent
physical mechanism. Decoherence and einselection appear to explain classicality in an
observer-independent way, but do so only if the particular systems on which they are taken
to be acting are specified in advance. Zurek (2003) attempts to justify such a specification
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by assuming the existence of systems as “axiom(o)”; however, this assumption is not strong
enough to produce a classically-objective world containing only the systems that human
observers in fact observe. Classical objectivity “emerges” by the mechanisms of decoherence
and einselection only if “axiom(o)” is replaced by a much stronger axiom: “The Universe
consists of these systems” followed by a listing of some Hilbert-space decompositions at
the expense of all others. A universe in which such a system-specifying axiom holds is a
universe in which physical dynamics is forced to respect a fixed set of pre-established system
boundaries, i.e. it is a universe in which decompositional equivalence is false.
We have, however, no evidence that we live in a universe in which decompositional equiv-
alence is false, and the evidence of successful science to argue that it is not. We must,
therefore, look elsewhere for the origin of classicality. The most obvious option is that the
origin of classicality lies not in physics but in us: in the very definitions of observation
and communication. Bohr (1928) argued for this option on the basis of common sense,
Moore (1956) did so on the basis of classical automata theory, and Reoderer (2005) does so
on the basis of evolutionary biology and neuroscience. Anyone who embraces Landsman’s
“stance 1” that “quantum theory is fundamental and universally valid, and the classical
world has only ‘relative’ or ‘perspectival’ existence” (Landsman (2007) p. 425) should not
be uncomfortable with this position.
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